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ESSAY
INDEPENDENT OF THE CONSTITUTION?
ISSUES RAISED BY AN INDEPENDENT FEDERAL
LEGISLATIVE ETHICS COMMISSION WITH
INDEPENDENT ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY
Paul Taylor *
I. CONGRESSIONAL ETHICS SELF-ENFORCEMENT
AND THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE
To date, Congress has consistently kept its committees with ju-
risdiction over the ethical behavior of its members internal to the
operations of the House of Representatives and the Senate.' Be-
cause it has done so, the federal courts have generally refrained
from becoming involved in the internal decisions and operational
details of such congressional ethics committees under what has
become known as the "political question doctrine."
Black's Law Dictionary defines a political question as "[a] ques-
tion that a court will not consider because it involves the exercise
of discretionary power by the executive or legislative branch of
* B.A., 1991, Yale College, summa cum laude; J.D., 1994, Harvard Law School, cum
laude.
1. See MILDRED AMER, ENFORCEMENT OF CONGRESSIONAL RULES OF CONDUCT: AN
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 1-5 (Congressional Research Service 2007). In 1964, the Senate
created the Select Committee on Standards and Conduct and in 1967, the House estab-
lished the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct. Id. at 5. Conduct and financial dis-
closure regulations for Members, officers and certain employees were adopted in 1968.
Since then, the two ethics committees have "authority to investigate allegations of wrong-
doing by Members, officers, and employees; adjudicate [ I evidence of misconduct and rec-
ommend penalties, when appropriate; and provide advice on actions permissible under the
congressional codes of conduct." Id.
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government."2 Under the political question doctrine, a court will
not hear a case-that is, a case will be non-justiciable and not
proper for judicial determination-if sufficient separation of pow-
ers concerns are raised. This was the case in Baker v. Carr, where
the Supreme Court found the political question doctrine applica-
ble when there is a "textually demonstrable constitutional com-
mitment of the issue to a coordinate political department ... or
the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution
without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government ....
Such a "textually demonstrable constitutional commitment...
to a coordinate political department" is found in article I, section
5, clause 2 of the Constitution, which states that "[elach House
may determine the Rules of its Proceedings . . . ."' Consequently,
the political question doctrine protects each house's decisions re-
garding the implementation of the rules governing the non-
criminal behavior of members of Congress from judicial interfer-
ence, as long as such rules are implemented by each house of
Congress, and not an independent entity.
II. PROPOSALS TO CREATE AN INDEPENDENT FEDERAL
LEGISLATIVE ETHICS COMMISSION WITH INDEPENDENT
AUTHORITY TO ENFORCE INVESTIGATORY RULES
Following the recent criminal investigations of a few members
of Congress, there have been renewed calls in some quarters for
the creation of an independent federal legislative ethics commis-
sion an ("independent commission") that would be empowered
with independent enforcement authority. This independent com-
mission could exercise authority, at its own initiative without
prior approval by a house of Congress, to conduct investigations
of alleged unethical behavior by members of Congress. A letter
signed by the leading private organizations supporting the crea-
tion of such an independent commission states:
2. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1197 (8th ed. 2004).
3. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
4. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 5, cl. 2.
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An Office of Public Integrity should be created with the following es-
sential elements:
The Office should have the powers necessary to conduct investiga-
tions, including the authority to administer oaths, and to issue and
enforce subpoenas ... [and] [tihe Office should have the authority to
dismiss frivolous complaints expeditiously and to impose sanctions
for filing such complaints.
The Office's Director or panel members ... should not be Members or
former Members.
5
Proponents consider these two enforcement features-
subpoena authority and the power to sanction frivolous com-
plaints--essential to the success of any such independent com-
mission. Subpoena enforcement authority is necessary to allow an
independent commission to follow investigations wherever it de-
sires, free from political pressures. Without enforcement author-
ity, such a commission would come to be seen as a paper tiger.
The power to sanction frivolous complaints is necessary to deter
filing of all types of irresponsible charges against members. Such
meritless ethics charges, if undeterred, would generate ethical
probe headlines for months and inevitably tarnish the images of
innocent members whose claim to office relies on their good repu-
tation among their voting constituents.
The subpoena power and the authority to sanction frivolous
complaints were granted to the Kentucky Legislative Ethics
Commission,' which proponents of a federal independent com-
mission hold as a model Congress should follow.7
5. See, e.g., Letter from the Campaign Legal Center, et al., to all Members, U.S.
House of Representatives (Dec. 21, 2006), available at http://www.campaignlegalcenter.
org/press-2305.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2007).
6. The statute creating the Kentucky Legislative Ethics Commission, for example,
provides that "[any person who knowingly files with the commission a false complaint of
misconduct on the part of any legislator or other person shall be guilty of a Class A mis-
demeanor," KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6.686(6) (LexisNexis 2003), which carries a maximum
penalty of a $500 fine. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 534.040(2)(a) (LexisNexis 1999). It also
provides that the commission can issue subpoenas enforceable in court. See KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 6.666(3) (LexisNexis 2003) ("The commission may administer oaths; issue subpoe-
nas; compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of papers, books, accounts,
documents, and testimony; and have the deposition of witnesses taken in the manner pre-
scribed by the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure for taking depositions in civil actions. If
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III. LOSING THE SAFE HARBOR AGAINST JUSTICIABILITY
UNDER THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE
Assuming for the moment that either house of Congress could
constitutionally create an independent commission, an immediate
result would likely be that such commission's enforcement actions
would be justiciable in federal court-whereas the actions of con-
gressional committees composed of elected members generally are
not.
In Baker, the Supreme Court enumerated a list of six factors
that should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis before a court
will determine whether the political question doctrine precludes
it from hearing a case:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political ques-
tion is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of
the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the im-
possibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a
kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a
court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack
of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual
need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already
made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pro-
nouncements by various departments on one question.
8
These factors are vague to some extent, but none clearly pre-
clude a court from considering challenges to enforcement actions
taken by a commission composed of non-members acting inde-
pendently of the House or Senate and its own ethics committees.
A decision by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit indicates that federal courts would consider such chal-
lenges.
a person disobeys or refuses to comply with a subpoena, or if a witness refuses to testify to
a matter regarding which he may be lawfully interrogated, the Franklin Circuit Court
may, on application of the commission, compel the obedience by proceedings for contempt
as in the case of disobedience of a subpoena issued from the Circuit Court or a refusal to
testify in Circuit Court. Each witness subpoenaed under this section shall receive for his
attendance the fees and mileage provided for witnesses in Circuit Court, which shall be
audited and paid upon the presentation of proper vouchers sworn to by the witness.").
7. See Lobby and Ethics Reform: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution,
Civil Rights and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 6 (2007)
[hereinafter Dufendach] (testimony of Sarah Dufendach, Chief of Legislative Affairs,
(Common Cause) ("In Kentucky, for example, a Legislative Ethics Commission established
14 years ago now has the resounding support of legislators.").
8. 369 U.S. at 217.
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In Consumers Union v. Periodical Correspondents' Ass'n, the
D.C. Circuit considered a claim by Consumer Reports that it was
unconstitutionally denied Capitol press credentials and gallery
access by a private organization, the Executive Committee of the
Periodical Correspondents' Association, which acted under the
supervision of the Speaker of the House and the Senate Commit-
tee on Rules and Administration.9 In that case, the court held the
issue was nonjusticiable under the political question doctrine be-
cause "beyond declining to accredit Consumer Reports, none of the
[Periodical Correspondents' Association] took any action or en-
forced any orders against [Consumer Reports]."1 Such would not
be the case, of course, if an independent federal legislative ethics
commission acted to enforce its sanctions orders or subpoenas.
Because such a commission would take such actions independ-
ently of each house of Congress, the political question doctrine
would no longer insulate the commission's decisions from the in-
volvement of federal courts. This raises the possibility that courts
could impose additional procedures, rights, and duties unin-
tended by Congress on the commission.
The experience in Rhode Island provides an example. In Rhode
Island the state's independent ethics commission fined then-
Governor DiPrete for ethical violations." In DiPrete v. Morsilli,
the Rhode Island Supreme Court upheld the commission's fine
against Governor DiPrete for selecting a business associate to
perform work for the state.'2 The court, however, reversed a sec-
ond fine the Commission assessed against Governor DiPrete for
influencing the award of a contract to a campaign contributor's
9. 515 F.2d 1341, 1342 (D.C. Cir. 1975). The relevant Congressional rules provided
that:
The [press] applications required. . . shall be authenticated in a manner that
shall be satisfactory to the executive committee of the Periodical Correspon-
dents' Gallery who shall see that the occupation of the galleries is confined to
bona fide and accredited resident correspondents, newsgatherers, or reporters
of reputable standing who represent one or more periodicals which regularly
publish a substantial volume of news material ....
The Periodical Press Galleries shall be under the control of an executive
committee elected by members of the Periodical Correspondents' Association,
subject to the approval and supervision of the Speaker of the House of Repre-
sentatives and the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration.
Id. at 1344-45 (emphasis omitted).
10. Id. at 1346-47.
11. DiPrete v. Morsilli, 635 A.2d 1155, 1158 (R.I. 1994).
12. Id. at 1162-64, 1167.
20081
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engineering firm. 13 The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that
the Commission could not find a conflict of interest unless it first
established that the parties entered into a quid pro quo agree-
ment in which the engineering contract was promised in ex-
change for the contribution.' 4 While the court's decision was
couched as an interpretation of the statutory Rhode Island Code
of Ethics, the result prevented the Ethics Commission from en-
forcing a categorical ban on public officials awarding contracts to
campaign contributors.
Just as ethical rules must be applied on a case-by-case basis,
judicial interpretations of their various applications under a gov-
erning statute would also be applied case-by-case by the courts.
As one commentator summarized the legal dynamic in Rhode Is-
land:
There is much uncertainty regarding how, in the long run, the
[Rhode Island] Ethics Commission will co-exist among the three
branches of state government. At this time, however, one thing is
clear: when Rhode Island created an "independent" Ethics Commis-
sion through constitutional amendment, the resulting agency's
clashes with the other branches of state government have led to sig-
nificant dislocation of traditional separation of powers principles.'
5
As the Rhode Island experience shows, courts can become in-
volved in the operation of independent ethics commissions in un-
expected ways, with unexpected results.16 This would likely occur
regardless of whether such independent commission were created
by statute or by a rule of either house of Congress.
There would, however, be differences in a statutorily based,
and a rule-based commission. With a statute-based independent
ethics commission the Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia Circuit has held that the separation of powers doctrine would
not prevent federal courts from asserting jurisdiction over the
statute. In United States v. Rose, a congressman argued that his
prosecution by the Department of Justice under the Ethics in
Government Act, which statutorily codified parts of the Rules of
13. Id. at 1165-67.
14. See id. at 1166.
15. Samuel D. Zurier, Rhode Island's Ethics Laws: Constitutional and Policy Issues,
R.I. BAR J., June 1996, at 9, 54.
16. Of course, Rhode Island state law precedents, like all state law precedents, are not
binding on federal courts regarding the interpretation of federal law, so no state legal
precedents can predict how federal courts might rule in similar situations.
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the House of Representatives, violated the separation of powers
doctrine. 7 In that case, the court held:
We do not think the DOJ's action against Congressman Rose offends
the separation of powers doctrine. The DOJ brought this action un-
der section 706 of the Ethics Act, which authorizes it to investigate
and prosecute "knowing and willful" violations of the Act. It is true
that the disclosure requirements of the Ethics Act applicable to
Members of Congress have been incorporated into the House Rules,
... which are enforced by the House pursuant to its constitutional
power to discipline its Members. But by codifying these requirements
in a statute, Congress has empowered the executive and judicial
branches to enforce them; in bringing this action, then, the DOJ was
fulfillinf its constitutional responsibilities, not encroaching on Con-
gress's. 8
Even if House or Senate rules alone created an independent
ethics commission, any punishment of private citizens who are
not members of Congress would likely lead to federal court in-
volvement. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit has held that "judicial intervention may be appropriate
where rights of persons other than members of Congress are jeop-
ardized by Congressional failure to follow its own [internal] pro-
cedures." 9
The Supreme Court itself has intervened when private citizens
were punished as a result of actions taken by a House committee.
Early on, the Supreme Court noted the importance of protecting
nonparticipants in the political process. In United States v.
Smith, the Court noted that, "[a]s the construction to be given to
the [Senate] rules affects persons other than members of the Sen-
ate, the question presented is of necessity a judicial one."2 ° In
Christoffel v. United States, the Supreme Court continued to
demonstrate its willingness to take an active role when proce-
dural rules affect people outside of Congress.2' In that case,
17. 28 F.3d 181, 181-82 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (congressman defending against a civil pen-
alty action for filing false financial reports with the Clerk of the House in violation of the
Ethics in Government Act of 1978).
18. Id. at 190 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
19. Metzenbaum v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 675 F.2d 1282, 1287 (D.C. Cir.
1982) (emphasis added). And in United States v. Cisneros, 169 F.3d 763, 770 (D.C. Cir.
1999), the same court held that separation of powers concerns did not prevent a federal
court from addressing the validity of an indictment where the defendant was not a mem-
ber of any branch of government. Id.
20. 286 U.S. 6, 33 (1932) (emphasis added).
21. 338 U.S. 84 (1949).
2008]
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Christoffel testified before the House Committee on Education
and Labor and was later convicted of perjury based on his testi-
mony." Christoffel claimed that, insofar as the statute required
"an oath or affirmation before a competent tribunal," the convic-
tion could not stand because at the time of the alleged perjury, a
quorum of the Committee was not present.23 Christoffel argued
that the lack of a quorum deprived the Committee of its status as
a competent tribunal.2 4 He further asserted that it was irrelevant
that a quorum was present when testimony began three hours be-
fore the perjurious statements were actually made.25 The Court
acknowledged that, as a matter of legislative procedure, where no
point of order is raised, a quorum is presumed to continue.26 But
Christoffel, as a nonmember, had no capacity to raise a point of
order.27 As the Court stated, "[in a criminal case affecting the
rights of one not a member, the occasion of trial is an appropriate
one for petitioner to raise the question.""
Another example is Yellin v. United States, which involved the
effect of a congressional procedural rule on the interests of a pri-
vate party.29 In that case, petitioner Yellin refused to answer
questions put to him by a Subcommittee of the House Committee
on Un-American Activities.3 ° Yellin's refusal to answer led to his
conviction on four counts of contempt of Congress.3' Yellin con-
tended that the committee failed to comply with its own rules and
therefore his conviction could not be sustained.32 The rule at issue
was committee Rule IV, which required the committee to consider
injury to the witness's reputation when deciding whether to hold
the interrogatory session in a public or an executive session.3
Yellin's claim centered on the fact that the committee apparently
failed to consider reputational injury in response to his request
22. Id. at 85.
23. Id. at 85-86, 85 n.2.
24. Id. at 85-86.
25. Id. at 86.
26. Id. at 87-88.
27. See id. at 88.
28. Id.
29. 374 U.S. 109 (1963).
30. Id. at 111.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 112-14.
33. Id. at 114-15.
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for an executive session.34 The Court reversed the conviction, not-
ing that where Congress clearly intended the rule as a protective
measure for the benefit of witnesses, "the most logical person to
have the right to enforce those protections is the witness himself'
in federal court.35
These cases indicate that those who are fined by an independ-
ent ethics commission under whatever procedures are deemed by
Congress to be most conducive to eliminating and deterring frivo-
lous complaints, or those who face enforcement actions to compel
compliance with subpoenas issued by such a commission, might
not only have their fines reversed or modified, but they may also
be granted due process procedural protections not contemplated
by the legislators who enacted the commission. The more inde-
pendent a commission is from Congress, the more likely federal
courts will be able to insert themselves into the workings and
proceedings of the commission and reorganize its operations, as
the federal courts-composed of lifetime-appointed unelected
judges-deem appropriate.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES RAISED BY THE DELEGATION
OF A HOUSE OF CONGRESS'S AUTHORITY TO ENFORCE
CONTEMPT CHARGES
The Supreme Court has held that although Congress has the
inherent authority to investigate, when Congress assumes the in-
vestigatory function, the authority to conduct the investigation
must be set forth in a specific congressional resolution.36 In Wat-
kins v. United States, the Supreme Court rejected the validity of a
congressional investigation on the grounds that the resolution
creating the inquiry was overly vague.37 The Court stated:
An essential premise in this situation [the enforcement of con-
tempt of Congress charges] is that the House or Senate shall have
instructed the committee members on what they are to do with the
power delegated to them .... That requires that the instructions to
an investigating committee spell out that group's jurisdiction and
purpose with sufficient particularity. Those instructions are embod-
34. Id. at 111-12.
35. Id. at 116.
36. See Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 201 (1957).
37. See id. at 201-04.
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ied in the authorizing resolution. That document is the committee's
charter. Broadly drafted and loosely worded, however, such resolu-
tions can leave tremendous latitude to the discretion of the investi-
gators.
Combining the language of the resolution with the construction it
has been given, it is evident that the preliminary control of the
Committee exercised by the House of Representatives is slight or
non-existent. No one could reasonably deduce from the charter the
kind of investigation that the Committee was directed to make. As a
result, we are asked to engage in a process of retroactive rationaliza-
tion. Looking backward from the events that transpired, we are
asked to uphold the Committee's actions unless it appears that they
were clearly not authorized by the charter. As a corollary to this in-
verse approach, the Government urges that we must view the matter
hospitably to the power of the Congress-that if there is any legisla-
tive purpose which might have been furthered by the kind of disclo-
sure sought, the witness must be punished for withholding it. No
doubt every reasonable indulgence of legality must be accorded to
the actions of a coordinate branch of our Government. But such def-
erence cannot yield to an unnecessary and unreasonable dissipation
of precious constitutional freedoms.
The Government contends that the public interest at the core of
the investigations of the Un-American Activities Committee is the
need by the Congress to be informed of efforts to overthrow the Gov-
ernment by force and violence so that adequate legislative safe-
guards can be erected. From this core, however, the Committee can
radiate outward infinitely to any topic thought to be related in some
way to armed insurrection. The outer reaches of this domain are
known only by the content of "un-American activities." Remoteness
of subject can be aggravated by a probe for a depth of detail even far-
ther removed from any basis of legislative action. A third dimension
is added when the investigators turn their attention to the past to
collect minutiae on remote topics, on the hypothesis that the past
may reflect upon the present.
. . . An excessively broad charter, like that of the House Un-
American Activities Committee, places the courts in an untenable
position if they are to strike a balance between the public need for a
particular interrogation and the right of citizens to carry on their af-
fairs free from unnecessary governmental interference.
3
38. Id. at 201, 203-06; see also Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S. 399, 407-08
(1961) (noting that House Rule XI does not state the subject under inquiry in a given hear-
[Vol. 42:543
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Such principles seem to require that Congress issue individual-
ized and specific authorizing resolutions before initiating individ-
ual ethics investigation enforcement actions. It also seems that if
either house of Congress created an independent commission
charged with something as broad as rooting out political corrup-
tion or the appearance of such corruption, it would not be a suffi-
ciently specific authorizing charter-just as the Supreme Court
found an authorization for a general investigation into un-
American activities unconstitutionally vague.39
Currently, the full House of Representatives or the full Senate
must approve a contempt of Congress enforcement action before
the issue can be handed to the Department of Justice for poten-
tial prosecution.4 ° The constitutional basis for the statutory au-
thority flows at least in part from Congress' authority under arti-
cle I, section 5, clause 2 of the Constitution, which states that
"[elach House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings ... 41
This constitutional provision allows each house to enforce those
very rules outlined in Section III within the constitutionally pre-
scribed means Congress has to punish its members and within
the limitations in place to protect the rights of private parties. 2
But, the further removed an independent commission with en-
forcement authority becomes from direct control by each house of
Congress, the weaker becomes such commission's claim to consti-
tutional authorization.
The Supreme Court has given strong indications that Congress
may not be able to outsource its subpoena power and other en-
forcement authority regarding ethics investigations to an inde-
pendent commission. By doing so, Congress would be delegating
ing with adequate precision).
39. See Watkins, 354 U.S. at 209.
40. See 2 U.S.C. § 192 (2000) ("punishable by a fine of not more than $1,000 nor less
than $100 and imprisonment in a common jail for not less than one month nor more than
twelve months"); 2 U.S.C. § 194 (requiring after a contempt of Congress claim is brought,
the appropriate United States attorney must bring the matter to the grand jury for ac-
tion); S. SELECT COMM. ON ETHICS, 108TH CONG., SENATE ETHICS MANUAL app. at 378
(Comm. Print 2003) (describing how Senate committees must issue subpoenas and initiate
civil and criminal enforcement proceedings); see also H. COMM. ON STANDARDS OF OFFICIAL
CONDUCT, 105TH CONG., RULES 17 (Comm. Print 1997) (describing how House of Repre-
sentatives committees and sub-committees must issue subpoenas and allege violations).
The Senate may also bring a civil contempt action directly to federal court. See 2 U.S.C. §
288b(b) (2000).
41. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 5, cl. 2.
42. Id.
20081
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
to people who are not federal legislators the power to decide
which congressional ethics issues to pursue. In Watkins, the
Court made clear that a charge of contempt of Congress will
stand only when the delegation of investigatory authority to
members of Congress is sufficiently specific because "[t]he more
vague the committee's charter is, the greater becomes the possi-
bility that the committee's specific actions are not in conformity
with the will of the parent House of Congress."43 The committee
that delegated authority to issue subpoenas without congres-
sional approval, of course, could not be said to be in conformity
with Congress's will.44
The Court in Watkins emphasized the need to keep compulsory
processes within the strict control of the legislative branch in or-
der to ensure that the legislature itself would be responsible for
whatever actions it took or did not take.45 The Court stated:
The legislature is free to determine the kinds of data that should be
collected. It is only those investigations that are conducted by use of
compulsory process that give rise to a need to protect the rights of
individuals against illegal encroachment. That protection can be
readily achieved through procedures which prevent the separation of
power from responsibility and which provide the constitutional requi-
sites of fairness for witnesses.46
The legislature, and individual legislators, can only be held re-
sponsible for their actions in the constitutional sense if they re-
tain tight enough control over the decisionmaking process to al-
43. Watkins, 354 U.S. at 201 (emphasis added).
44. See id.
45. See id. at 215.
46. Id. (emphasis added). In an earlier case defining each House's authority to enforce
contempt charges, the Supreme Court also made clear that such authority could only be
exercised under the direct supervision of the people's elected legislature. See Anderson v.
Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 228-29 (1821). In Anderson, the Court stated:
That a deliberate assembly, clothed with the majesty of the people, and
charged with the care of all that is dear to them, composed of the most distin-
guished citizens, selected and drawn together from every quarter of a great
nation, whose deliberations are required by public opinion to be conducted
under the eye of the public, and whose decisions must be clothed with all that
sanctity which unlimited confidence in their wisdom and purity can inspire,
that such an assembly should not possess the power to suppress rudeness, or
repel insult, is a supposition too wild to be suggested. And, accordingly, to
avoid the pressure of these considerations, it has been argued, that the right
of the respective Houses to exclude from their presence, and their absolute
control within their own walls, carry with them the right to punish contempts
committed in their presence ....
Id. (emphasis added).
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low voters to assign legislators individual responsibility for their
actions.47 This would include actions taken to further congres-
sional ethics enforcement. No case has held that either house of
Congress may delegate any of its constitutional authority to an
independent entity to "determine the Rules of its Proceedings"
under article I, section 5, clause 2 of the Constitution.
Congress, of course, also has "[aill legislative powers" under ar-
ticle 1, section 1 of the Constitution. When the Supreme Court
upheld Congress's power to issue subpoenas, it stated such au-
thority could be exercised as a function of Congress's legislative
power.4" Regarding Congress's authority to delegate its legislative
power, the Supreme Court historically has held that Congress
may not delegate such power to another branch of government.49
But, as Congress increasingly allocated regulatory powers to ex-
ecutive agencies following the New Deal, the Supreme Court, in
order to ensure that the delegation of authority was constitu-
tional, held that Congress must legislate an intelligible principle
47. See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 377-78 (1951) ("Self-discipline and the
voters must be the ultimate reliance for discouraging or correcting such abuses.").
48. See McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 160-61, 174-75 (1927)
The first of the principal questions ... is ... whether the Senate-or the
House of Representatives, both being on the same plane in this regard-has
power, through its own process, to compel a private individual to appear be-
fore it or one of its committees and give testimony needed to enable it effi-
ciently to exercise a legislative function belonging to it under the Constitu-
tion.
The Constitution provides for a Congress consisting of a Senate and
House of Representatives and invests it with "all legislative powers" granted
to the United States, and with power "to make all laws which shall be neces-
sary and proper" for carrying into execution these powers and "all other pow-
ers" vested by the Constitution in the United States or in any department or
officer thereof. Other provisions show that . . . each house is to be distinct
from the other, to have its own officers and rules, and to exercise its legisla-
tive function independently. But there is no provision expressly investing ei-
ther house with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end
that it may exercise its legislative function advisedly and effectively ....
We are of opinion that the power of inquiry-with process to enforce it-
is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function ....
... Thus there is ample warrant for thinking, as we do, that the consti-
tutional provisions which commit the legislative function to the two houses
are intended to include this attribute to the end that the function may be ef-
fectively exercised.
Id.
49. See Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892).
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to which the agency must conform. 5' This intelligible principle
was found absent recently in Whitman v. American Trucking
Ass'ns.51 In Whitman, the Court explained that of the two stat-
utes analyzed, one "provided literally no guidance for the exercise
of discretion, and the other of which conferred authority to regu-
late the entire economy on the basis of no more precise a standard
than stimulating the economy by assuring 'fair competition.'
52
Consequently, it is questionable whether Congress can delegate
subpoena power derived from its legislative authority to an inde-
pendent commission charged with the regulation of something so
broad as, for example, congressional ethics on the basis of no
more precise a standard than "reducing corruption or the appear-
ance of corruption."
It may be argued that each individual ethics inquiry would be
part of Congress's ongoing efforts to gather information before
crafting generally applicable lobbying reform and ethics legisla-
tion. But, this argument would be akin to the proposition that
Congress could use its subpoena power to investigate crimes
committed by individuals as part of its ongoing efforts to gather
information before crafting generally applicable criminal laws. In
McGrain v. Daugherty, the Court rejected such arguments and
made clear that subpoena authority would not extend to investi-
gations of a purely personal nature:
It is quite true that the [congressional] resolution [at issue in the
case] directing the investigation does not in terms avow that it is in-
tended to be in aid of legislation; but it does show that the subject to
be investigated was the administration of the Department of Jus-
tice-whether its functions were being properly discharged or were
being neglected or misdirected, and particularly whether the Attor-
ney General and his assistants were performing or neglecting their
duties in respect of the institution and prosecution of proceedings to
punish crimes and enforce appropriate remedies against the wrong-
doers-specific instances of alleged neglect being recited. Plainly the
subject was one on which legislation could be had and would be ma-
terially aided by the information which the investigation was calcu-
lated to elicit. This becomes manifest when it is reflected that the
functions of the Department of Justice, the powers and duties of the
Attorney General and the duties of his assistants are all subject to
regulation by congressional legislation ....
50. Hampton v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928).
51. 531 U.S. 457, 474-76, 486 (2001).
52. Id. at 474.
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The only legitimate object the Senate could have in ordering the
investigation was to aid it in legislating ....
We think the resolution and proceedings give no warrant for think-
ing the Senate was attempting or intending to try the Attorney Gen-
eral at its bar or before its committee for any crime or wrongdoing.
53
In the case of an independent federal legislative ethics commis-
sion, however, investigations into individual member misconduct
would be conducted explicitly to "try the [member] at its bar or
before its committee" for wrongdoing on the part of the individual
member.
V. MORRISON V. OLSON
The degree of control that each house of Congress would be
constitutionally required to have over the enforcement decisions
of an independent commission must also be considered under the
Supreme Court's decision in Morrison v. Olson.
In Morrison, the Court upheld the part of the Ethics in Gov-
ernment Act ("Act") insofar as it permitted the appointment of an
independent counsel to investigate and potentially prosecute
high-ranking government officials for violations of federal crimi-
nal laws.54 Under the Act, the Attorney General is required to
conduct a preliminary investigation after receiving information
he or she determines is 'sufficient to constitute grounds to inves-
tigate whether any person [covered by the Act] may have violated
any federal criminal law."' 5 After completion of the investigation
or ninety days have passed, whichever date is earlier, the Attor-
ney General must report to a Special Division, a special court
created "for the purpose of appointing independent counsels.""6
The Attorney General must also report a finding of "no reason-
able grounds to believe that further investigation is warranted" to
the Special Division. 57 As a result, the Special Division would not
have the "'power to appoint an independent counsel."'5 8 On the
53. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 177-79 (1927) (emphasis added).
54. 487 U.S. 654, 660, 696-97 (1988).
55. Id. at 660-61 (quoting 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-592 (2000)).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 661.
58. Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 592(b)).
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other hand, if the Attorney General determines that reasonable
grounds exist to continue the investigation or prosecution, then
he or she must apply to the Special Division for the appointment
of an independent counsel.59 The Special Division is then required
to appoint an independent counsel and define the counsel's prose-
cutorial jurisdiction.6 °
The degree of control the Supreme Court required the Attorney
General to have over the independent counsel was crucial to de-
termining that the independent counsel did not "violate[ ] the
principle of separation of powers by unduly interfering with the
role of the Executive Branch."6' The Court determined that the
independent counsel law was constitutional under the separation
of powers because it did not unduly interfere with the role of the
Executive Branch.6 2 But, it held as it did only because under the
Act:
No independent counsel may be appointed without a specific request
by the Attorney General, and the Attorney General's decision not to
request appointment if he finds "no reasonable grounds to believe
that further investigation is warranted" is committed to his unre-
viewable discretion. The Act thus gives the Executive a degree of
control over the power to initiate an investigation by the independ-
ent counsel. In addition, the jurisdiction of the independent counsel
is defined with reference to the facts submitted by the Attorney Gen-
eral, and once a counsel is appointed, the Act requires that the coun-
sel abide by Justice Department policy unless it is not "possible" to
do so.
63
If the same analysis were applied to an independent federal
legislative ethics commission, the commission would have to be
constrained by the following: (1) it could only initiate investiga-
tions pursuant to a specific request by a house of Congress; (2) a
prior decision by a house of Congress "not to request appointment
if [it] finds no reasonable grounds to believe that further investi-
gation is warranted" would have to be "committed to [the] unre-
viewable discretion" of such house; (3) each house would have to
retain "a degree of control over the power to initiate an investiga-
tion by the independent [commission];" and (4) the jurisdiction of
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 693.
62. Id. at 696-97.
63. Id. at 696.
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the independent commission would have to be "defined with ref-
erence to the facts submitted by [the house of Congress] ."64
Without these safeguards to protect the supervisory authority
of Congress, an independent commission with independent en-
forcement authority would likely be seen under Supreme Court
precedents as unduly interfering with the role each house of Con-
gress has in punishing its own members. 5
VI. CONCLUSION
The preceding analysis strongly suggests that Supreme Court
precedents would require each house of Congress to retain so
much authority to initiate ethics investigations into its members
and so much authority to define the scope and direction of the in-
quiries, that any congressionally created independent ethics com-
mission ultimately would not be able to serve its intended pur-
pose. If such a commission is constitutionally required to seek
permission from a house of Congress before proceeding with in-
vestigations and enforcement actions, the utility of the commis-
sion would be questionable as the commission itself would be per-
ceived as a paper tiger. Such utility would be further questioned
if federal courts imposed a host of rights and duties on such a
commission that Congress did not intend.
It becomes more difficult to see the utility of creating an inde-
pendent federal legislative ethics commission if courts will pre-
vent it from independently, promptly, and reliably dismissing
frivolous complaints under rules established by Congress or if the
Constitution prevents it from independently issuing subpoenas to
compel testimony. Under such circumstances, the "independent"
commission would be reduced to doing essentially no more than
what other private organizations already do-namely recom-
mending that Congress initiate its own investigation regarding
matters the private organization uncovered through its own ca-
pacity.
64. See id. This latter requirement is consonant with the Supreme Court's decisions
requiring that congressional investigations be authorized by sufficiently specific authoriz-
ing resolutions. See Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S. 399, 407-08 (1961); Watkins v.
United States, 354 U.S. 178, 201, 203-04, 206 (1957).
65. See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
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Stanley Brand, a former General Counsel to the House of Rep-
resentatives, has said:
I have no doubt that Congress can constitutionally delegate to an
outside body the initial steps of investigating and making recom-
mendations for disciplinary cases .... Congress itself has to approve
or ratify, or review those recommendations, because the Constitution
says it's their job to do that. But ... this is not an exclusive proc-
ess.
66
That seems true enough. The initial steps of investigating and
making recommendations for disciplinary cases, however, is one
thing-currently, all types of private organizations perform this
function by bringing to Congress's attention the information it
has gathered through its own resources. It is quite another thing
to grant an independent entity the enforcement authority to fine
people and issue subpoenas for their compelled testimony in a
congressional ethics investigation.
While public opinion may support the creation of some sort of
independent commission, 67 public opinion cannot trump constitu-
tional separation of powers principles that form the basis of our
system of checks and balances that ultimately rests on the peo-
ple's determinations at the voting booth regarding whether their
elected representatives should remain in office.68
66. Transcript of Independent Ethics Committee Panel Discussion at 31-32 (Jan. 23,
2006 (quoting Stanley Brand, Brand Law Groups, How Congress Can Create An Inde-
pendent Ethics Commission) (quoted in Dufendach, supra note 7).
67. A January 2007 poll conducted by the Washington Post and ABC News found that
84% of the adults surveyed supported "establishing a permanent, independent commission
to investigate and enforce ethics rules for members of Congress and their staffs." Washing-
ton Post-ABC News Poll, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/
polls/postpoll_012007.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2007).
68. The Supreme Court itself said generally in dicta, in United States v. Brewster, 408
U.S. 501, 518-19 (1972), that "[ain accused Member is judged by no specifically articulated
standards," and that "Congress is ill-equipped to investigate, try, and punish its Members
for a wide range of behavior that is loosely and incidentally related to the legislative proc-
ess."
[Vol. 42:543
